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Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13

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Shapiro, P., Sonstelie, J. Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13. Public Choice 39, 113–142 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00242151

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