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A refutation of axiological naturalism

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References

  1. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 139.

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  2. Robert L. Holmes, “Descriptivism, Supervenience, and Universalizability,” The Journal of Philosophy, LXIII, No. 5 (3 March 1966), 113–119.

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  3. I am indebted to discussions with my colleagues at the University of Colorado, especially Berry Crawford, and also with Walter Coole of Skagit Valley Junior College.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Drury College, USA

    J. Brenton Stearns

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  1. J. Brenton Stearns
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Stearns, J.B. A refutation of axiological naturalism. J Value Inquiry 1, 117–123 (1967). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00240087

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00240087

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