Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Elections and government spending

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This “electoral theory of spending” is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bennett, J.T. and DiLorenzo, T.J. (1983). Underground government: The off-budget public sector. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, R.A. (1989). Elections, representation, and congressional voting behavior. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Domenici, P. (1980). Can Congress control spending? Policy Review 14 (Fall): 49–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A. (1960). Why the government budget is too small in a democracy. World Politics 12 (4): 541–563.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, P. and Jondrow, J. (1984). Congressional elections and local federal spending. American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 147–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, M.P. (1977). Congress keystone of the Washington establishment. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garand, J.C. (1988). Explaining government growth in the U.S. States. American Political Science Review 82 (3): 837–849.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hibbing, J.R. (1984). The liberal hour: Electoral pressures and transfer payment voting in the United States Congress. The Journal of Politics 46: 846–865.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D., Konda, T. and Garand, J. (1984). Spending in the states: A test of six models. Western Political Quarterly 37: 48–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Payne, J.L. (forthcoming). The culture of spending.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lytton Research and Analysis, 335 Lavina Avenue, 83864, Sandpoint, ID

    James L. Payne

Authors
  1. James L. Payne
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Payne, J.L. Elections and government spending. Public Choice 70, 71–82 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239345

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239345

Keywords

Search

Navigation