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Claiming races, broiler contracts, heresthetics, and habits: ten concepts for policy design

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Abstract

The formulation of policy alternatives can be viewed as an exercise in institutional design. What concepts should inform the craft of institutional design? This essay draws ideas from three intellectual sources to develop and illustrate ten representative concepts for institutional design. First, it presents concepts from the economics of organization involving the creation of desirable incentives: (1) inducing third-party enforcement through the creation of value, (2) making commitments credible, and (3) maintaining competition through tournaments. Second, it presents concepts from heresthetics involving the favorable structuring of decisions: (4) fixing agendas behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ (5) automating policy decisions, (6) linking policy dimensions, and (7) collapsing and unlinking policy dimensions. Third, it presents concepts from the behavioral perspective recognizing the importance of habits and norms: (8) adapting organizational routines, (9) instilling and exploiting norms, and (10) monitoring through reporting and diligence requirements. These concepts are intended to help policy analysts be more creative in the crafting of policy alternatives.

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  1. Public Policy Analysis Program, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA

    David L. Weimer

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Weimer, D.L. Claiming races, broiler contracts, heresthetics, and habits: ten concepts for policy design. Policy Sci 25, 135–159 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00233745

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