Abstract
This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.
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We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of course, are ours.
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Brueckner, J.K., O'Brien, K.M. Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats. Public Choice 63, 15–41 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00223270
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00223270