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The idea behind this paper was prompted by a discussion with Oded Liviatan who also provided helpful comments.
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Beenstock, M. A democratic model of the “rent-sought” benefit cycle. Public Choice 63, 1–14 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00223269
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00223269