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Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

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Abstract

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.

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Greenbaum, S.I., Kanatas, G. & Venezia, I. Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand. J Real Estate Finan Econ 4, 351–366 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00219503

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