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Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System

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Authors
  1. Neil T. Skaggs
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  2. Cheryl L. Wasserkrug
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Additional information

The authors wish to thank Sam Witsman, Kevin Heid and Tark Choong Sup for their help in computing and data collection and Jack Chizmar for his advice on econometrics. Department of Economics, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61761.

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Skaggs, N.T., Wasserkrug, C.L. Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System. Public Choice 41, 295–306 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00210363

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