Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

On the stability of legislative outcomes

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper argues that by arranging vote trades in the face of information costs, legislative committees contribute to the stability of legislative outcomes. A structure of permanent committees and subcommittees facilitates informational specialization and helps legislators acquire experience in their specializations. Committees arrange vote trades by adjusting amounts of recommended spending on separate items in bills that receive majority support. Each legislator is allotted a roughly equal amount of legislative spending that he can influence plus an additional amount that depends on his skill and experience as a committee member.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bennett, J.T., and Mayberry, E.R. (1979). Federal tax burdens and grant benefits to states: The impact of imperfect representation. Public Choice 34: 255–269.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Butler, H.N. (1980). The role of congressional tenure in the distribution of federal grants. Unpublished paper available from its author at College of Business Administration, Texas A&M University.

  • Fenno, R.F., Jr. (1966). The power of the purse: Appropriations politics in Congress. Boston: Litte, Brown and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoenack, S.A. (1983). Economic behavior within organizations. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keefe, W.J., and Ogul, M.S. (1968). The American legislative process: Congress and the States, second edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, B., Crawford, R.G., and Alchain, A.A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics 21(October): 297–326.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koford, K.J. (1982). Centralized vote-trading. Public Choice 38: 245–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19(August): 211–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(Spring): 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1981). Why so much stability? Public Choice 37(2): 189–205.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, 412 Morrill Hall, 55455, Minneapolis, MN

    Stephen A. Hoenack

Authors
  1. Stephen A. Hoenack
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hoenack, S.A. On the stability of legislative outcomes. Public Choice 41, 251–260 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00210359

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00210359

Keywords

Search

Navigation