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Group choice between three or more alternatives

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  1. Vesturvallagötu 5, 101, Reykjavik

    Björn S. Stefánsson

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  1. Björn S. Stefánsson
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Stefánsson, B.S. Group choice between three or more alternatives. Qual Quant 16, 433–454 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00209714

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