Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp 265–299 | Cite as

Experimental markets for insurance

  • Colin Camerer
  • Howard Kunreuther


This article extends the large amount of research on double-oral auction markets to hazards that produce only losses. We report results from a series of experiments in which subjects endowed with low-probability losses can pay a premium for insurance protection. Insurers specify the price at which they are willing to assume the risk of a loss. Insurance prices approach expected value for a large range of probabilities and loss amounts. Subjects seem to realize losses are statistically independent. Prices are not affected by ambiguity about the probability of loss.

Key words

insurance experimental economics prospect theory 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin Camerer
    • 1
  • Howard Kunreuther
    • 2
  1. 1.The Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia
  2. 2.The Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia

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