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Can reallocation of rights help to avoid the Paretian Liberal Paradox?

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. FernUniversität Hagen, Feithstrβe 140, Postfach 940, D-5800, Hagen 1, Germany

    Friedrich Breyer

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  1. Friedrich Breyer
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The author is grateful to Christian Seidl for critical comments.

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Breyer, F. Can reallocation of rights help to avoid the Paretian Liberal Paradox?. Public Choice 65, 267–271 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204950

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