Abstract
The consequences of institutional change in the budgetary process are not generally determinate independent of the preferences of political actors. Nonetheless, this study shows for a general class of preference configurations that the legislative branch cannot be made better off by a spending limitation unless the executive is empowered with a line-item veto. In the absence of executive item-veto authority there is no incentive for the legislature to constrain spending.
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This study was undertaken while the author was Visiting Scholar at the Center for Study of Public Choice. Akira Yokoyama provided helpful comments on an early version of the paper. Financial assistance from both Holy Cross College and the Center for Study of Public Choice is gratefully acknowledged.
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Schap, D. Executive veto and spending limitation: Positive political economy with implications for institutional choice. Public Choice 65, 239–256 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204948
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204948