Abstract
This paper presents a rational choice model for the timing of parliamentary elections in political systems where the government has the option of calling an early election. The optimal timing of elections involves the government weighing the benefits of calling an election versus the costs and is modelled mathematically as an optimal stopping problem. The model implies that the timing of elections depends upon time left in the government's term, the degree of electoral uncertainty, the volatility of government popularity, the government's time rate of discount, and institutional constraints such as the length of term and whether the government is likely to be forced from power by a vote of no confidence.
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Balke, N.S. The rational timing of parliamentary elections. Public Choice 65, 201–216 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204945
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204945