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Public goods and Arrovian social choice

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Abstract

A social welfare function satisfying Arrow's independence axiom is constant or authoritarian if it generates continuous and transitive social preferences over the space of allocations of public and private goods, and individual preferences have the classical economic properties. The social welfare function will be oligarchial if it generates continuous and quasitransitive social preferences and satisfies a weak version of the Pareto criterion in addition to the independence axiom.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, 23187-8795, Williamsburg, VA, USA

    Donald E. Campbell

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  1. Donald E. Campbell
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Additional information

This work was supported by the National Sciences Foundation grant no. SES 9007953. I am grateful to anonymous referees whose suggestions led to several substantial improvements.

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Campbell, D.E. Public goods and Arrovian social choice. Soc Choice Welfare 9, 173–183 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00192876

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00192876

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