Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 87–95 | Cite as

Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors

  • Sven Berg


With the aid of a simple discrete probability model, the Condorect Jury Theorem is extended to situations where there is dependency between judgement. It is shown that negative intra-voter correlation improves on jury competence in the sense that the probability of a correct decision increases. Positive correlation, on the other hand, tends to decrease jury competence. The results given here are obtained with the aid of simple recursion relations.


Probability Model Recursion Relation Correct Decision Discrete Probability Simple Recursion 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sven Berg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of StatisticsUniversity of LundLundSweden

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