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Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules

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Abstract

Given the preferences of two agents over a finite set of alternatives, an arbitration rule selects some fair compromise. We study the idea that more consensus should not be harmful: the closer your preferences are to mine (in the sense of Grandmont's (1978) intermediate preferences), the better I like the selected alternative. We describe several Pareto optimal rules satisfying this principle. If, in addition, a condition akin to Suppes' (1966) grading principle is imposed, the rule must always choose an alternative maximizing the welfare of the worst-off agent, measured by the number of alternatives that he finds worse than the chosen one.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. C.R.D.E. and Départment de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, H3C 3J7, Montréal, Québec, Canada

    Yves Sprumont

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  1. Yves Sprumont
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Additional information

Stimulating discussions with H. Moulin and helpful comments from J. Crémer are gratefully acknowledged. The author also wishes to thank a referee and an associate editor for challenging remarks. This research was partly supported by a CAFIR grant from the Université de Montréal.

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Sprumont, Y. Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules. Soc Choice Welfare 10, 1–15 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187429

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187429

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