Abstract
We consider two-state automata playing repeatedly the Prisoner's Dilemma (or any other 2 × 2-game). The 16 × 16-payoff matrix is computed for the limiting case of a vanishingly small noise term affecting the interaction. Some results concerning the evolution of populations of automata under the action of selection are obtained. The special role of “win-stay, lose-shift”-strategies is examined.
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Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K. & El-Sedy, E. Automata, repeated games and noise. J. Math. Biol. 33, 703–722 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00184645
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00184645