Marxism and methodological individualism

Conclusion

“Analytical” or “rational choice” Marxism explicitly proposes to synthesize non-Marxist methods and Marxist theory. It is therefore in-appropriate to attack it solely by demonstrating that the methods advocated were not Marx's: this is, after all, acknowledged at the outset. (For this reason I have tried to show that both the assumption of MI and the process of reduction are problematic on their own empiricist or positivist terms, and have therefore largely been discarded as viable projects by philosophers of science.) Any attempt to synthesize two such distinct research traditions nonetheless demands some consideration of the metatheoretical problems that one might expect it to encounter, and this is particularly so if Marxist theory is to be recast on the basis of the positivist and empiricist assumptions explicitly rejected by Marx. Curiously, however, the analytical Marxist literature does not address such problems: indeed, metatheoretical considerations are notably absent. Discussions focus instead on particular “tools of analysis,” e.g., rational choice theory and game theory, as if these were neutral with respect to the underlying philosophical commitments of the two traditions. In fact, of course, these methods do reflect such commitments; after all, the justification for rational choice Marxism, infusing Marxian analyses with “scientific” rigor, reflects the rejection of the conception of science embodied in the Marxist tradition. By way of a conclusion I therefore briefly discuss the uneasy relationship between rational choice Marxism and classical Marxist theory. I argue that this relationship cannot be one of synthesis because the empiricist assumptions of rational choice Marxism violate the “hard-core” of the Marxist research tradition in at least three important ways: 1) most generally, its atomistic ontology directly contradicts the relational ontology of Marxist theory; 2) the empiricist conception of science undermines the Marxist conception of social science as critique; and 3) more specifically, rational choice and game theory mark a retreat from the social and relational philosophical anthropology of Marx back to the liberal individualist tradition initiated by Hobbes.

The most fundamental incompatibility between analytical Marxism and classical Marxism resides in the differences dividing the atomistic or individualist ontology underpinning empiricism and MI from the relational ontology on which Marxist theory is based. The incompatibility of these commitments demands that a choice be made between them: either only observable individuals exist and are explanatory, or unobservable social structures and relations also exist and have explanatory import, but not both. The commitment to incompatible ontological assumptions prevents the rational choice Marxist project from initiating a “progressive problem-shift” in the Marxist tradition because these ontological positions form part of the “hard-core” of each tradition, and as such are “irrefutable by [prior] methodological decision.” Although changes in some of the assumptions of a research tradition are necessary to stimulate a progressive problem-shift, these changes may not occur in the “hard-core,” which remains by definition inviolable. That is, an ontological shift indicates not a change of direction within a research tradition, but a change from one research tradition to another. The adoption of a competing ontological stance thus results not in the reinvigoration of Marxist theory, but in its replacement with a competing research tradition. Rational choice Marxism thus cannot, as its practitioners would wish, be the means by which “what is true and important in Marxism [can] be more firmly established.”

A second fundamental difference between choice-theoretic and classical Marxist theory concerns the status of critique in their conceptions of social science. A central component of the Marxist problématique and its notion of science is the critique of existing social structures and institutions with an eye to their (usually revolutionary) transformation. Marx believed, for example, that from the moment that the bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distribution which correspond to it are recognized as historical, the delusion of regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes and the prospect opens up of a new society, [a new] economic social formation, to which capitalism is only the transition.

A critique of existing social forms, however, requires both a critique of central explanatory concepts and an ontology in which the social structures and relations to be transformed are real and thus amenable to investigation. Because social relations are themselves the result of human practices, rather than “natural,” this critical perspective provides an understanding of the options available for radical system transformation. An individualist framework, by denying reality to social structures and relations and taking certain social institutions as natural, relegates social change to “piecemeal engineering” or incrementalism because it prestructures both the nature of the questions that can be asked about change and the answers that are possible. And in fact, the conservative implications of such a framework were an explicit objective of its proponents. Major structural changes are considered illusory, at best, because they presuppose a “holistic” or structural, and thus meaningless, conception of society. An empiricist and individualist conception of science therefore produces “problemsolving theory” rather than “critical theory.” Individualism subverts the critical element so central to Marxist theory.

Finally, rational choice and game theory violate a third element in the “hard-core” of Marxist theory - its social or relational model of “man.” For Marx, the essence of man is “the ensemble of social relations” that are spécific to particular historical social formations. These relations constitute individuals; they confer onto them definite characteristics, motives for action, and so on. Marx thus conceived of human nature as social and mutable, rather than “natural” and fixed, and rejected the notion of “abstract” individuals considered in isolation of the social relations in which they are embedded. In fact, the idea of isolated, individual human beings is itself the product of a particular historical context. Rational choice and game theory, however, rest upon just the liberal model of “man” that Marx rejected. In this model, each person is assumed to be an immutable, isolated (atomistic), and self-interested calculator whose rationality is defined instrumentally. As with their respective ontological commitments, each of these contradictory conceptions of “man” forms part of the irrefutable “hard-core” of a distinct research tradition, and thus cannot be altered without stepping outside of that tradition. How, if at all, these two incompatible conceptions of human nature can be fused is thus a problem that must, at the least, be addressed by rational choice Marxists.

All this does not mean, however, that game theory is completely incompatible with Marxist analysis. There clearly exist, within the purview of Marxist theory, situations of strategic interaction that would benefit from a game-theoretic representation. The issue of class compromise examined by Przeworski is a good example, as are the collective action problems faced by the capitalist and working classes. There is room here for game theory for two reasons. First, these are situations in which the context and rules of the game, the actors, and the preferences have been established by prior theoretical analyses. Secondly, they occur in societies, specifically modern, western, capitalist ones, in which actors are constituted as reasonable approximations of the rational, calculating maximizers assumed by the liberal model of man underlying rational choice and game theory. Game theory can thus provide a more or less precise representation of, and rigorously clarify the logic of, situations of strategic interaction in particular modern societies. This, however, makes it viable as an end-point of, but not as the foundation for, certain narrowly defined aspects of Marxist analysis.

The role of choice-theoretic methods in Marxist theory is thus necessarily limited. The reason is simple - the Marxist problématique revolves around more general, structural questions that precede choice-theoretic analyses because these presuppose the structures and relations underlying the manifest forms of historical social formations and the behavior of individuals within them. That is, Marxist theory is concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with structural analyses, and these must necessarily be completed prior to the analysis of the intentional behavior or interactions of specific individuals. As Oilman says: In history, conceived of as history of the species, [man] is abstracted as a human being as distinct from other animals. In history, conceived of as history of classes, man is abstracted as a class being, the real subject of history on this dimension being classes. In history, conceived of as the history of capitalism... man is abstracted as the typical subject of capitalism... In history, conceived of as the history of modern English (or French or American) capitalism, man is abstracted as particular nations, religions and parties as well as factions of classes, and has begun to acquire the distinguishing qualities that justify individual names and domiciles. Only on this level of abstraction of “history” can we begin to speak about motivation and choice.

Exaggerated claims for the use of game theory (or rational choice theory) thus neglect the fact that all inputs into a choice-theoretic analysis have in fact been established, prior to that analysis itself, by an unreduced structural theory, in this case Marxism. The context of the game, the rules of the game, the preferences of the players, and even the production and identification of the relevant actors all presuppose the structural analysis provided by Marxist theory. “Logically, the game starts only after the actors have been constituted, and their order of preferences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot be considered as part of the game.” Indeed, not only are these “processes” not part of the game, but, as was discussed earlier, they cannot be understood within a strictly individualist approach. In additon, as is evident in Elster's own discussion of the solutions to the collective action problem of the working class, the analysis of social change so central to Marxist theory cannot be grasped by game theory. Elster claims that this collective action problem can be surmounted either through a change in the preferences of the working class or through the effective exercise of leadership, thus producing a shift from a “prisoner's dilemma” to an “assurance” game. The change that produces either of these shifts is, however, clearly located outside of the game itself. That is, the PD or assurance games do not explain or contribute to our understanding of the actual change that produced the shift to class consciousness and effective collective action. At best, these games function as tools that can highlight the fact that a change has occurred; an additional explanation of that change is still required. Game theory therefore cannot provide “solid microfoundations for any study of social structure and social change” because all of the traditional “givens” of game-theoretic Marxism must be established outside the boundaries of game theory by an unreduced, relational Marxist theory that is recognized as meaningful on its own terms.