Conclusion
The evidence that televising legislative sessions helps politicians from homogeneous districts, where everyone agrees with his positions, but hurts politicians from heterogeneous districts, does not differentiate between whether politicians are search or experience goods. While evidence does exist that politicians are search goods (e.g., Lott, 1987b), it relies on the presence of the last period problem. If the conclusion that politicians are search goods is correct, it has important implications, because it contradicts the commonly held belief that it is the threat of re-election that prevents politicians from behaving opportunistically. It also indicates that there are fundamental differences between firm and political brand names.
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We would like to thank Mark Crain and an anonymous referee from this journal for their helpful comments. This paper was accepted while Lott was at the Hoover Institution and Montana State University.
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Fremling, G.M., Lott, J.R. Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods. Public Choice 58, 73–78 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183329
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183329