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Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards

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An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the Public Choice Society Meeting, Tucson AZ, 27–29 March 1987. Our thanks to Laura Langbein, Steve Maser, Eugenia Froedge-Toma, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments. Special thanks to George Racette.

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Choate, G.M., Thompson, F. Budget makers as agents: A preliminar investigation of discretionary behavior under state-contingent rewards. Public Choice 58, 3–20 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183325

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