Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- 247 Downloads
A model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses) and the same number of individuals is considered. The allocation of houses among the individuals according to a queue order is analysed. First an allocation mechanism is constructed where it is a dominant strategy for the individuals to truthfully report their preferences. Second it is demonstrated that in order to obtain the desired allocation, the individuals must not in general report their complete ranking of the houses, but only their maximal elements in recursively defined choice sets.
Financial support from Jan Wallander's Foundation for Research in the Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Gale D (1984): Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money. Int J Game Theory 13: 61–64Google Scholar
- Maskin ES (1987): On the fair allocation of indivisible goods. In: Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Public Policy, Feiwell G (ed). MacMillan Press, London, pp 343–349Google Scholar
- Quinzii M (1984): Core and equilibria with indivisibilities. Int J Game Theory 13: 41–61Google Scholar
- Roth AE (1982) Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Econ Lett 9: 127–132Google Scholar
- Shapley L, Scarf H (1974): On cores and indivisibility. J Math Econ 1: 23–37Google Scholar
- Svensson L-G (1983): Large indivisibles — an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness. Econometrica 51: 939–954Google Scholar
- Svensson L-G (1984): Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods. J Econ 44: 373–386Google Scholar
- Svensson L-G (1991): Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in a model with indivisible goods. Econometrica 59: 869–877Google Scholar
- Varian HR (1974): Equity, envy and efficiency. J Econ Theory 9: 63–91Google Scholar