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Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments

Abstract

We show that the Slater's set of a tournament, i.e. the set of the top elements of the closest orderings, is a subset of the top cycle of the uncovered set of the tournament. We also show that the covering relation is related to the hamiltonian bypaths of a strong tournament in that if x covers y, then there exists an hamiltonian bypath from x to y.

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We thank B. Monjardet and an anonymous editor for helpful suggestions.

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Banks, J.S., Bordes, G. & Le Breton, M. Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments. Soc Choice Welfare 8, 355–363 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183046

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183046

Keywords

  • Covering Relation
  • Close Ordering
  • Strong Tournament