Abstract
This paper revisits the aggregation theorem of Chichilnisky (1980), replacing the original smooth topology by the closed convergence topology and responding to several comments (N. Baigent (1984, 1985, 1987, 1989), N. Baigent and P. Huang (1990) and M. LeBreton and J. Uriarte (1990a, b). Theorems 1 and 2 establish the contractibility of three spaces of preferences: the space of strictly quasiconcave preferences P SCO, its subspace of smooth preferences P supSinfSCO , and a space P 1 of smooth (not necessarily convex) preferences with a unique interior critical point (a maximum). The results are proven using both the closed convergence topology and the smooth topology. Because of their contractibility, these spaces satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) for aggregation rules satisfying my axioms, which are valid in all topologies. Theorem 4 constructs a family of aggregation rules satisfying my axioms for these three spaces. What these spaces have in common is a unique maximum (or peak). This rather special property makes them contractible, and thus amenable to aggregation. However, these aggregation rules cannot be extended to the whole space of preferences P which is not contractible and therefore does not admit continuous aggregation rules satisfying anonymity and unanimity, Chichilnisky (1980, 1982). The results presented here clarify an erroneous example in LeBreton and Uriarte (1990a, b) and respond to Baigent (1984, 1985, 1987) and Baigent and Huang (1990) on the relative advantages of continuous and discrete approaches to Social Choice.
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Comments from Geoffrey M. Heal, Andreu Mas Colell, Jean Francois Mertens and Maurice Salles are gratefully acknowledged. Research support was provided by NSF SES 8409857.
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Chichilnisky, G. Social choice and the closed convergence topology. Soc Choice Welfare 8, 307–317 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183042
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183042