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Implementation in generic environments

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Abstract

In this paper, we study implementation in “economic environments”. It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f, and ε>0, there exists another social choice function, f ε, within ε of f uniformly and implementable in Nash equilibrium on the dense subset.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Queen's University, K7L 3N6, Kingston, Canada

    James Bergin

  2. Indian Statistical Institute, 7 S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, 110016, New Delhi, India

    Arunava Sen

Authors
  1. James Bergin
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  2. Arunava Sen
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Additional information

The authors thank John Duggan, Ed Green and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments. Bergin Acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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Bergin, J., Sen, A. Implementation in generic environments. Soc Choice Welfare 13, 467–478 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182857

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182857

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