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Voting power when using preference ballots

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a generalized power index which gives a measurement of voting power in multi-candidate elections with weighted voting using preference ballots. We use the power index to compare the power of various players between an election using plurality and one using the Borda method. The power index is based upon the Banzhaf power index.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Carleton College, 55057, Northfield, MN, USA

    Deanna B. Haunsperger

  2. Department of Mathematics, St. Lawrence University, 13617, Canton, NY, USA

    Duncan J. Melville

Authors
  1. Deanna B. Haunsperger
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  2. Duncan J. Melville
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Haunsperger, D.B., Melville, D.J. Voting power when using preference ballots. Soc Choice Welfare 13, 457–465 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182856

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182856

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