Abstract
We consider a social choice problem in various economic environments consisting of n individuals, 4≤n<+∞, each of which is supposed to have classical preferences. A social choice rule is a function associating with each profile of individual preferences a social preference that is assumed to be complete, continuous and acyclic over the alternatives set. The class of social choice rules we deal with is supposed to satisfy the two conditions; binary independence and positive responsiveness. A new domain restriction for the social choice rules is proposed and called the classical domain that is weaker than the free triple domain and holds for almost all economic environments such as economies with private and/or public goods. In this paper we explore what type of classical domain that admits at least one social choice rule satisfying the mentioned conditions to well operate over the domain. The results we obtained are very negative: For any classical domain admitting at least one social choice rule to well operate, the domain consists only of just one profile.
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Nagahisa, Ri. Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate. Soc Choice Welfare 13, 383–395 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182850
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182850