Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 9, Issue 4, pp 361–372 | Cite as

The effect of social homogeneity on coincidence probabilities for pairwise proportional lottery and simple majority rules

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Sven Berg
Article

Abstract

The Condorcet efficiency of Pairwise Proportional Lottery Rules (PPLR) is considered under various assumptions concerning the likelihood that given voters' preference profiles are observed on three alternatives. Representations are developed for the expected Condorcet efficiency under impartial culture, impartial anonymous culture, and a generalization to Pólya-Eggenberger distributions. PPLR is shown to be equivalent to a random selection process in the limit of voters under impartial culture. However, relatively small increases in social homogeneity, as measured by Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, cause significant increases in the Condorcet efficiency of PPLR.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
    • 1
  • Sven Berg
    • 2
  1. 1.Departments of Business Administration and EconomicsUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.Department of StatisticsUniversity of LundLundSweden

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