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Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings

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Abstract

The Kemeny distance for preference orderings is used to determine individual rankings of social preferences. Based on this distance function, the strategy-proofness of social welfare functions is examined. Our main result is an impossibility theorem stating that no social welfare function can be strategy-proof, if some additional properties are required.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, N2L 3G1, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Walter Bossert

  2. Department of Economics, Tilburg University, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Ton Storcken

Authors
  1. Walter Bossert
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  2. Ton Storcken
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Additional information

The work on this paper initiated while Walter Bossert was a visitor at the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University. The hospitality and the support of CentER and its members are gratefully acknowledged. Ton Storcken's research was supported by a grant from the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven University. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 1991 Canadian Economic Theory Meeting in Toronto. We thank the participants and especially Ingrid Peters-Fransen for comments. Substantial improvements are due to the suggestions of Bernard Monjardet and two referees.

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Bossert, W., Storcken, T. Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings. Soc Choice Welfare 9, 345–360 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182575

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