Abstract
This paper studies the question whether there are nondictatorial procedures for collective decision making which ensure that collective decisions are Pareto-efficient if all agents choose strategies that are not weakly dominated. It is shown that contrary to what one might expect the answer is not entirely negative.
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This paper is a shortened and revised version of Börgers (1989a). I would like to thank John Moore and Ariel Rubinstein for their comments on a very early version of this research. I have also benefited from the reactions of seminar participants in London, Visegard, Paris, and Basel. I am grateful to a referee and to an associate editor for helpful suggestions.
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Börgers, T. Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games. Soc Choice Welfare 8, 65–78 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182448
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182448