Abstract
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith (1973) and Young (1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.
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References
Moulin H (1988) Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Smith J (1973) Aggregation of preferences with a variable electorate. Econometrica 41: 1027–1041
Young HP (1975) Social choice scoring functions. Siam J Appl Math 28: 824–838
Young HP (1988) Condorcet's theory of voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 82: 1231–1244
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Myerson, R.B. Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption. Soc Choice Welfare 12, 59–74 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182193
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182193