The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending

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Abrams, B.A., Dougan, W.R. The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending. Public Choice 49, 101–116 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00181033

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Keywords

  • Public Finance
  • Governmental Spending
  • Constitutional Restraint