Abstract
The paper formalizes a notion of preference-based freedom and examines to which extent such a notion is consistent with otherwise standard conditions of rational decision making. The central result is as follows. Suppose that a preference-based ranking of opportunity sets satisfies a very mild condition of “preference for freedom of choice”. Then, either the ranking is degenerate in being discontinuous, or the underlying preference relation among the basic alternatives is incomplete. Hence, in any case preference-based rankings of freedom will violate at least some of the basic assumptions of traditional choice modelling. This conclusion is enhanced if the conditions on preference-based freedom are slightly strengthened.
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I would like to thank the participants of seminars held at the Universities of Karlsruhe and Vienna for valuable comments and stimulating discussions. I am especially indebted to Thomas Christ, Egbert Dierker, Georg Kirchsteiger, Dieter Puppe and anonymous referees for helpful comments. The research has been made possible by a fellowship of the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) which is also gratefully acknowledged.
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Puppe, C. Freedom of choice and rational decisions. Soc Choice Welfare 12, 137–153 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179829
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179829