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Public pensions

The role of public choice and expectations

Abstract

In this paper the public-choice approach to explaining the evolution of public pension schemes is surveyed. Emphasis is laid on the relation between expectations on future political decisions and future demographic and economic developments, on the one hand, and current political and economic decisions, on the other hand.

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Additional information

Revised version of an invited lecture given at the Sixth ESPE-Conference, June 11–13, 1992, Gmunden in Austria.

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Verbon, H. Public pensions. J Popul Econ 6, 123–135 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00178557

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00178557

Keywords

  • Economic Development
  • Political Decision
  • Economic Decision
  • Pension Scheme
  • Public Pension