Summary
The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.
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Dugatkin, L.A., Alfieri, M. Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction. Behav Ecol Sociobiol 28, 243–246 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00175096
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00175096