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Political instability and illegal immigration

Abstract

Economic theory suggests that transnational migration results from the push-pull effect of wage differentials between host and source countries. In this paper, we argue that political instability exacerbates the migration flow, with greater instability leading to relatively larger flows. We conclude then that an optimal solution to the illegal immigration problem requires proper coordination of immigration and foreign policies by the host country. A narrow preoccupation with tougher immigration laws is wasteful and may be marginally effective.

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The authors wish to acknowledge an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions. The research of Donald Lien is, in part, supported by a grant from The University of Kansas, GRF 3281-XX 0038.

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Campos, J.E.L., Lien, D. Political instability and illegal immigration. J Popul Econ 8, 23–33 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00172036

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00172036

Keywords

  • Economic Theory
  • Host Country
  • Foreign Policy
  • Wage Differential
  • Large Flow