The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer (Mueller, 1979: 1}
Abstract
We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to “trade off” benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.
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The Institute for Political Economy, Utah State University provided important financial support for this study. Donald Cundy, Alan Huston, Joe Oppenheimer, John Orbell, and Randy Simmons provided valuable comments on earlier drafts.
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Goetze, D., Galderisi, P. Explaining collective action with rational models. Public Choice 62, 25–39 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00168012
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00168012