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Why tropistic systems are not genuine intentional systems

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References

  • Dretske, F. I.: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Oxford.

  • Fodor, J. A.: 1986, ‘Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 3–23.

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  1. Philosophisches Seminar, Georg-August-Universität, 3400, Göttingen, Germany

    Ansgar Beckermann

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  1. Ansgar Beckermann
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Obviously, there is a certain resemblance between the title of this paper and the title of Fodor's recent paper ‘Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations’. This is no accident, since in this paper I address myself to almost the same questions as Fodor did in his. I shall come back to Fodor's answers at the end of section 3. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘Aspects of Consciousness and Awareness’ at the ZiF in Bielefeld. I am very much indebted to W. Ewald and K. Hillebrandt for correcting my English.

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Beckermann, A. Why tropistic systems are not genuine intentional systems. Erkenntnis 29, 125–142 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166369

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