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Skepticism and legal interpretation

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Box 4530, 79409, Lubbock, TX, U.S.A.

    Daniel O. Nathan

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  1. Daniel O. Nathan
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For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.

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Nathan, D.O. Skepticism and legal interpretation. Erkenntnis 33, 165–189 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166331

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166331

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