, Volume 33, Issue 2, pp 141–164 | Cite as

Burgeoning skepticism

  • Willem De Vries


This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.


Mental State Good Argument Recent Argument Occurrent Mental State Global Skeptic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Willem De Vries
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of New HampshireDurhamU.S.A.

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