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Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?

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Abstract

Treating corporate contributions as purchases of valuable inputs, we hypothesize that firms for which genetic diversity, advertizing, and reputations of environmental responsibility are more valuable and firms for which the cost of contributing is less will be more likely contributors to the Nature Conservancy. These hypotheses are supported by logit estimations which find firms in industries where biological inputs are important, firms with high advertizing expenditures, firms in industries with high costs of meeting environmental regulations, and large firms are more likely to contribute and so become Corporate Associates of the Nature Conservancy.

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This article is based upon a portion of Griffith's dissertation at NCSU. Thanks go to Tom Perry, Hugh Devine, Jan Laarman, and Gordon Tullock for their comments and encouragement and to the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Technologico of Brazil for financial support.

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Griffith, J.J., Knoeber, C.R. Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?. Public Choice 49, 69–77 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00163531

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