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Vote buying in a stylized setting

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Conclusions

As we noted in the introduction, we do not propose to discuss possible implications for the real world of democratic politics that may be drawn from the highly stylized models of vote buying that we have analyzed in this paper. To the extent that economic, legal, or moral thresholds prevent the emergence of the purchase and sale of votes among persons who initially possess property rights in the collective franchise, our whole analysis is simply inapplicable. If, however, such thresholds serve only to inhibit but not to prevent totally the emergence of such markets, there should be some value in an analysis that embodies the zero transactions costs assumption.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 22030, Fairfax, VA

    James M. Buchanan

  2. University of Georgia, 30602, Athens, GA

    Dwight R. Lee

Authors
  1. James M. Buchanan
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  2. Dwight R. Lee
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Additional information

We are indebted to Roger Faith, Arizona State University, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Buchanan, J.M., Lee, D.R. Vote buying in a stylized setting. Public Choice 49, 3–15 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00163527

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