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Implementation of the Thompson mechanism

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders the largely overlooked Thompson insurance mechanism for public choice. The mechanism's apparent defects can be remedied by a multi-part mechanism that generates necessary information and corrects potential errors. The added parts are (a) a sample of the population of eligible voters, who prepare a program for all voters' approval, and (b) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivot mechanism. One can use classical statistical methods to draw valid inferences from a population sample about the entire electorate, preserving incentive compatibility and permitting efficient outcomes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Emory University, 30322, Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.

    Martin J. Bailey

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  1. Martin J. Bailey
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Additional information

The author is indebted to Peter Aranson and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. The errors and omissions that remain are my own.

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Bailey, M.J. Implementation of the Thompson mechanism. Public Choice 89, 231–243 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159357

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159357

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