Abstract
The current paper discusses exclusive dealing in the context of the litigation which involved the sleeping car industry in the 1940's. Both efficiency and exclusionary considerations are analyzed. A novel aspect of the paper is its consideration of staggered contract expiration dates as a means of deterring entry.
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References
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I would like to thank Barry Seldon for helpful comments, and Richard Vedder for encouragement.
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Frasco, G.P. Exclusive dealing and the pullman sleeping car corporation. Rev Ind Organ 7, 227–240 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00158142
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00158142