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An alternative campaign finance reform: public “laundries” for secret cash contributions

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References

  • Pittman, Russell. ‘The Effects of Industry Concentration and Regulation on Contributions in Three 1972 U.S. Senate Campaigns.’ Public Choice 23 (Fall), 71–80, 1976.

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  • Pittman, Russell, ‘Market Structure and Campaign Contributions.’ Public Choice 31 (Fall), 37–52, 1977.

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  • Tobin, James. ‘On Limiting the Domain of Inequality.’ Journal of Law and Economics 13 (October), 263–277, 1970.

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  • Welch, William P. ‘The Economics of Campaign Funds.’ Public Choice 20 (Winter), 83–97, 1974.

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Authors
  1. John H. Beck
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Beck, J.H. An alternative campaign finance reform: public “laundries” for secret cash contributions. Public Choice 33, 125–127 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154691

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154691

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