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Professor of Economics, Indiana University. I would like to thank James Buchanan, Roger Sherman, George von Furstenberg, John Roberts, Richard Stout and Lloyd Orr for useful comments. Since I have not utilized all of the good advice tendered, the usual caveat must be entered.
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Morrison, C.C. A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions. Public Choice 33, 119–123 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154690
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154690