Abstract
The paper briefly reviews recent research that adapts and extends the Tiebout model of residential choice, paying special attention to those studies which utilize Hirschman's exit, voice and loyalty model. The paper argues that these are theoretically and empirically flawed since they do not take account of Tiebout-rational intra-jurisdictional moves but concentrate upon potential exiting behavior. The article then tests the importance of the inter-/intra-jurisdictional distinction using a logit model of factors using data from the 1990 Economic and Social Research Council Mobility Study (ECSRCMS) of London. Finding weak results from this analysis, the article then offers a more powerful test of factors predicting a move to jurisdictions with preferable tax rates.
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This research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council grant no. R000 23 3815. We thank the council for its support and Colin Mills and an anonymous referee for comments.
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Dowding, K., John, P. Exiting behavior under Tiebout conditions: Towards a predictive model. Public Choice 88, 393–406 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153240
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153240