Abstract
The One-man One-vote (OMOV) criterion is defined formally to demand (1) Maximum and equal voting power over the final outcome for each individual voter, and (2) Equal power-pervote for all groups of voters. We show that if it allotted Representative votes on a popular-vote-cast (rather than on the present census) basis, the Madisonian Electoral College system would assure individual voters the largest possible total power available to a “simple” system. This popular-vote basis (“MVP”) modification would relieve the present electoral impotence of voters in poorly-contested states without disturbing the voting power now enjoyed in closely-contested states.
qu]“The worth of a state, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.” John Stuart Mill
“And be these juggling fiends no more believed/That palter with us in a double sense,/That keep the word of promise to our ear,/And break it to our hope.” Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V Scene 8.
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Natapoff, A. A mathematical one-man one-vote rationale for Madisonian presidential voting based on maximum individual voting power. Public Choice 88, 259–273 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153233
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153233