Abstract
This paper offers a critical examination of the appropriateness of the traditional principal-agent model in describing the relationship between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and its congressional oversight committees. After studying the institutional reality of congressional oversight, I extend the traditional principal-agent model to incorporate both the Antitrust Division and the President as important players in the determination of federal antitrust policy. My empirical analysis of Antitrust Division enforcement trends covers almost four decades, from 1950 through the end of the Reagan administration. The results provide substantial evidence that the property rights of the congressional oversight committees are seriously attenuated, leaving open the possibly for bureaucratic discretion.
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Vachris, M.A. Federal antitrust enforcement: A principal-agent perspective. Public Choice 88, 223–238 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153231
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153231