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Zardkoohi, A., Giroux, G. Bureaucratic behavior and the choice of labor input: A study of municipal governments. Public Choice 64, 185–190 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153164
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00153164